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Land Accretion and Avulsion:
The Battle of Blackbird Bend'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1854, a United States government treaty established a reserva-
tion for the Omaha Indian Tribe.2 The reservation included a pen-
insula on the Nebraska side of the Missouri River. As surveyed
in 1867, the peninsula consisted of 3,000 acres and constituted only
a small percentage of the total land reserved for the tribe north
of Decatur, Nebraska.8
Today, there is no peninsula. The Missouri has pushed west,
shortening its long meander line. In 1975, the United States gov-
ernment and the Omaha Indian Tribe filed separate suits against
the record title holders of 11,000 acres of land in Monona County,
Iowa, which lie partially under the "same piece of sky" as the land
reserved in 1854, and claimed that the Iowa land belongs to the
Omaha Indian Tribe.4 Thus, the "Battle of Blackbird Bend" began.5
1. The 'Battle of Blackbird Bend" refers to three related suits in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa involv-
ing land in the Blackbird Bend area of the Missouri River in Monona
County, Iowa.
Two of the cases, United States v. Wilson and Omaha Indian Tribe
v. Jackson, were consolidated in United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp.
57 (N.D. Iowa 1977); 433 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Iowa 1977). The third
case, Omaha Indian Tribe v. Agricultural & Indus. Inv. Co., No. C 75-
4067 (N.D. Iowa, filed Oct. 6, 1975), is a suit by the tribe to quiet title
to the same land involved in the earlier suits plus additional land in
the Blackbird Bend area and two northerly bends. The three cases
were at one time consolidated, but the court severed the third case
from the first two, except as to the common land claimed.
2. Treaty with the Omahas, March 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043.
3. T.H. Barrett Survey, General Land Office, (April, May 1867). The
Omaha Indian Reservation consists of more than half of Thurston
County, Nebraska.
4. See note 1 supra. Particularly in the third suit, Omaha Indian Tribe
v. Agricultural & Indus. Inv. Co., No. C 75-4067 (N.D. Iowa, filed Oct.
6, 1975), the tribe claims more land than that lying under the same
piece of sky as the land reserved in 1854. All suits claim that the
land reserved for the tribe was cut off by avulsion or avulsions and
that more property accreted to these avulsive chunks.
6. Blackbird Bend peninsula derived its name from Chief Blackbird of
the Omaha Indian Tribe.
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This comment will focus on various legal principles related to
river movement, particularly those which have found acceptance
in Nebraska and Iowa. It will use the Blackbird Bend geographical
and historical situation to illustrate these principles, and will ana-
lyze the United States District Court's resolution of the case in the
Northern District of Iowa. Finally, this comment will explore the
policies underlying the rules of accretion and avulsion and will pro-
pose the recognition of an effective form of adverse possession
against the government.
II. PRINCIPLES OF RIVER MOVEMENT
A. Terms
Riparian land borders on streams and rivers.6 Changes in the
meander of a stream or river can affect the riparian landowner's
real estate rights and his rights to the stream water. The two
major processes by which a river alters its meander are accretion
and avulsion.8 The rights of riparian landowners may differ dras-
6. The term "riparian" comes from the Latin word ripa, meaning bank.
In Roman times, rights of riparian landowners were governed by prin-
ciples similar to those used today. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,
390 (1891).
Littoral land and rights pertain to the seashore and are governed
by principles similar to those used for riparian land.
7. For a discussion of water rights of riparian landowners, see R. CLAnx,
WATERS AND WATER RIGrTS (6th ed. 1972). For a general discussion
of land rights affected by river movement, see Beck, The Wandering
Missouri River: A Study in Accretion Law, 43 N.D.L. REv. 429 (1967).
8. An avulsion is a transfer of a piece of land from one bank of a river
to the other bank in such a way that it may be followed and identi-
fied as the same land. Accretion is an addition to riparian land which
slowly or rapidly results from the action of the river, but which is
beyond the power of identification.
Courts have often confused these definitions by describing an avul-
sion as "sudden" or "violent" and accretion and erosion as "gradual"
and "imperceptible." In Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605(1912), the Supreme Court said: "It is when the change in the stream
is sudden, or violent, and visible, that the title remains the same. It
is not enough that the change may be discerned by comparison at two
distinct points of time. It must be perceptible when it takes place."
Id. at 624. See also Valder v. Wallis, 196 Neb. 222, 224, 242 N.W.2d 112,
114 (1976); Jones v. Schmidt, 170 Neb. 351, 356, 102 N.W.2d 640, 645(1960); Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959); Burket
v. Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91 N.W.2d 57 (1958); Ziemba v. Zeller, 165
Neb. 419, 86 N.W.2d 190 (1957); Mercurio v. Duncan, 131 Neb. 767, 269
N.W. 901 (1936).
These adjectives used to describe accretion and avulsion are mis-
leading because the process of erosion is often sudden and violent. As
the Missouri erodes a bank, large chunks of soil, often containing trees,
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tically depending upon whether the river adjacent to their property
has moved by one process or the other.
For illustration, picture a river flowing with many bends, giving
it a snake-like appearance. Due to centrifugal force, the water
moving downstream pushes against the concave bank of each bend
as silt is deposited on the convex bank. The downstream banks
erode as accretion forms on the upstream banks. The meander of
the river thereby changes, some landowners gaining property by
accretion, and some losing property by erosion. This process of ac-
cretion is often referred to as accretion by alluvion.9 In some cases,
may plunge into the river and be washed away. See Beck, supra note
7. Simply because a large chunk of soil is violently and suddenly de-
tached from a bank does not mean that an avulsion has taken place.
An avulsion requires that the piece of property remain intact and iden-
tifiable as the very property cut off from the bank, even though it
is transferred to another bank or has acquired the status of an island.
For a good discussion distinguishing accretion from avulsion, see
Banks v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 92 F. Supp. 232 (E.D. Ark. 1950).
See also Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1892); Bellefontaine Imp. Co.
v. Niedringhaus, 181 Ill. 426, 55 N.E. 184 (1899); Coulthard v. Stevens,
84 Iowa 241, 50 N.W. 983 (1892); McCormack v. Miller, 239 Mo. 463,
144 S.W. 101 (1912); Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345 (1876).
Courts have also confused the terms "island" and "sandbar." See
Beck, supra note 7, at 463-64 n.158. Most courts agree that every piece
of soil protruding above the surface of the water is not an island. Dart-
mouth College v. Rose, 257 Iowa 533, 133 N.W.2d 687 (1965). A degree
of permanence is required. Courts may look to its size, whether it
is continually dry or only dry in periods of reduced flow, witness tes-
timony concerning its permanence, and vegetation. See Mather v.
State, 200 N.W.2d 498 (Iowa 1972). The distinction between islands
and sandbars is significant because an island is subject to independent
ownership, while a sandbar is part of the riverbed. See Payne v.
Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W. 912 (1921); Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511,
85 P. 763 (1906); State v. Loy, 74 N.D. 182, 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945).
The owner of an island is the owner of all accretions to the island
and continues to be the owner of all such property even if the island
moves downstream or becomes attached to the shoreline. Burket v.
Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91 N.W.2d 57 (1958). Because this distinction
can be crucial, clear definitions of island and sandbar are needed. The
most objective and easily determined criterion is the vegetation on the
land involved. A piece of property which contains secondary tree
growth demonstrates its permanence and its resistance to high water
flow without the need for lay testimony on permanence or expert testi-
mony on highwater marks. For the Missouri and similar rivers, the
courts should define "island" as a body of land surrounded by water
and containing substantial vegetation including trees.
9. Alluvion is the wash or flow of water against a bank or shore as in
a flood. Alluvion brings alluvium deposits. Alluvium deposits consist
of soil, sand and rock.
A river carries three types of foreign matter; (1) matter in solution
such as dissolved minerals, (2) matter in suspension such as clay and
light sand, and (3) bedload such as heavy sand and gravel.
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where silt does not accrete to a river bank, but rather the old river
bed is exposed after movement of the stream, the term "reliction"
is used. Reliction usually gives rise to the same legal consequences
as accretion by alluvion.'0 When land accretes to the property of
a riparian landowner, the accreted land is his." However, he also
runs the risk that his land will erode and be lost to him. Therefore,
in the Blackbird Bend situation, those holding record title to the
Iowa property asserted that the land claimed by the Indians ac-
creted to the Iowa banks.'
2
Re-emergence is a doctrine which has been used in a few states
to alter the normal legal results of accretion.3 When a landowner's
property has been eroded completely but later "re-emerges," by way
of accretion or reliction, some courts may allow him to claim the
re-emerged land if it is readily identifiable.14 Neither Nebraska' 5
10. Krumwiede v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491 (1964); Burket v.
Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91 N.W.2d 57 (1958).
Where the state owns the bed of a stream, it may assert a right
to an exposed river bed as against the right of the adjacent landowner.
However, a state has no right to such land under federal law. Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). See also Lundquist, Arti-
ficial Additions to Riparian Land: Extending the Doctrine of Accre-
tion, 14 ARIZ. L. Rzv. 315 (1972).
11. Accretion to riparian land is divided among landowners by drawing
a line from each landowner's boundary the shortest distance to the
river or stream. By this method, each landowner retains the same
percentage of riverfront, compared to his neighbors, as he owned be-
fore. In Nebraska, the county surveyors are responsible for measuring
accretions to property every five years for tax purposes. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 77-1306.01 (Reissue 1976).
12. Brief for Defendants at 1-47.
13. Of the seven states abutting the Missouri River the only two which
have indicated acceptance of the doctrine of re-emergence are the
Dakotas. See Peery v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965); Erickson
v. Horlyk, 48 S.D. 544, 205 N.W. 613 (1925); Allard v. Curran, 41 S.D.
73, 168 N.W. 761 (1918).
14. Re-emergence has been accepted by very few states. See Annot., 8
A.L.R. 640 (1920), supp. 41 A.L.R. 395 (1926). By "readily identifi-
able," courts require that the land be recognizable by natural land-
marks or measurable by metes and bounds. 8 A.L.R. at 642.
15. Wemmer v. Young, 167 Neb. 495, 93 N.W.2d 837 (1958) states:
If by gradual erosion a river becomes the boundary of land,
the owner thereof is a riparian owner and is entitled to all
accretion thereof. If by the process of accretion and reliction
the water of a stream gradually recedes, changes the channel
of the stream, and leaves the land dry that was previously
submerged by water, the land becomes the property of the
riparian owner. The erosion of a river which cuts entirely
across riparian land and into the land of an adjoining owner
operates to destroy the title of him whose land was originally
riparian and he may not reassert his title if the river reverses
its traverse wanderings and new land is formed within what
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nor Iowa' 6 accepts the re-emergence doctrine.
Under principles of avulsion, the same river might erode a part
of the bank of a bend so thoroughly that the river would cut
through completely to the next bend. Such was the case when
Carter Lake, Iowa, was moved west of the Missouri.1 When a river
moves by this process of avulsion, the ownership of the land cut
off by the river remains the same.' Therefore, in the Blackbird
Bend dispute, the Indian Tribe and the government asserted that
the land on the Iowa bank was transferred across the Missouri by
way of avulsions.29 Because an avulsion is much more unusual
than the constant process of accretion and erosion, accretion usually
is presumed by courts rather than avulsion.2 0
The principles of accretion and avulsion become more complex
when the river is a "braided" channel, with sandbars, islands and
chutes.2' This complexity is compounded when the braided channel
were his original boundaries.
Id. at 514, 93 N.W.2d at 848. Wemmer is also notable for its detailed
discussion of the value of lay and expert testimony.
16. Payne v. Hall, 192 Iowa 780, 185 N.W. 912 (1921) states:
It also appears to be the law that, where the lands of a ripar-
ian owner have been slowly and gradually eroded by a nav-
igable stream, and the river has usurped and taken up the
location of said land, the riparian owner of the land at the
newly formed river bank becomes entitled to the accretions
that may thereafter be formed against said bank, even though
they should extend over the same territory where lands of a
former riparian owner had been located before the erosion
took place. For example, if A is a riparian owner upon a nay-
iable stream, and B owns land remote therefrom, and by 
ero-
sion the river cuts away all of the lands belonging to A, and
leaves B as the riparian owner on the newly formed bank of
the stream, and thereafter the river slowly retires from this
situation and places accretions against the newly formed
bank, said accretions will belong to the riparian owner B, even
though they extend over the very space formerly occupied by
the riparian owner A.
Id. at 784, 185 N.W. at 915. See also Wilcox v. Pinney, 250 Iowa 1378,
98 N.W.2d 720 (1959) (the record owner of 850 acres of land lost title
when the Missouri River submerged his lands, even though the land
reappeared within 10 years and was readily identifiable by metes and
bounds).
17. If the river abandons a piece of its old channel in the process of avul-
sion, the water-filled channel becomes an "ox-bow" lake.
18. See Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1891);
Valder v. Wallis, 196 Neb. 222, 242 N.W.2d 112 (1976).
19. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67, 70 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
20. Dartmouth College v. Rose, 257 Iowa 533, 133 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Bone
v. May, 208 Iowa 1094, 225 N.W. 367 (1929); Kitteridge v. Ritter, 172
Iowa 55, 151 N.W. 1097 (1915).
21. A chute is a narrow channel of water flowing from an upstream sec-
tion of a river into a downstream section. When accumulation of al-
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is on the Iowa-Nebraska border, because the laws of the states differ
on the issue of ownership of the river bed. In Nebraska, the ripar-
ian owner owns the river bed adjacent to his land to the thread
of the stream,22 or the "thalweg.123  But, in Iowa, the state owns
the bed of the stream to the thalweg24 and, therefore, claims any
islands rising on the eastern half of the Missouri.25
B. The Value of Evidence
Because the rights of riparian owners may differ drastically de-
pending upon whether a river alters its course by accretion or avul-
sion, the question of how to prove accretion or avulsion becomes
of paramount importance. To prove that the land in question was
created by one process or the other, an attorney may need to intro-
duce evidence of vegetation, soil composition, and elevation. Charts
and maps are persuasive when available, and some weight may be
given-lay testimony. However, because potamology 26 is a complex
science, courts have begun to find expert testimony by hydrologists
to be most persuasive.27 A party who wants to prove that land in
luvium closes a chute at the upstream end, the chute becomes a bayou.
When a bayou is filled with silt and becomes a low muddy area, it
is a slough.
The main types of channels are braided, meandering, deltaic dis-
tributary, and anabranching. See 15 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANICA, 882
(15th ed. 1974).
22. Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 125 (1972).
23. The term "thalweg" means thread of the stream, or more precisely,
the deepest point in the bed of the river; therefore, the thalweg will
be the last point in the river to run dry.
24. 406 U.S. at 126.
25. Dartmouth College v. Rose, 257 Iowa 533, 133 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Solo-
mon v. City of Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472 (1952).
26. Potamology is the study of rivers, from the Greek "potamos," mean-
ing river.
27. See Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289 (1974); see also Ussery v.
Anderson-Tully Co., 122 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Ark. 1954); Durfee v. Keif-
fer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 249, 260-
64 (1975).
A United States Supreme Court case, a Nebraska case, and an Iowa
case illustrate the value of the right evidence.
In Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289 (1974), the two states
sought to fix their boundary line by determining jurisdiction over a
dry bed of the Mississippi River and an area known as "Luna Bar."
The United States Supreme Court set the boundary line where Missis-
sippi proposed, supporting the conclusions of a Special Master's report
and finding that "Luna Bar" had been formed by sandbar accretion
rather than avulsion from the Arkansas bank.
First, Mississippi presented a prima facie case for accretion through
expert testimony, physical evidence and charts. The experts demon-
strated that, according to principles of hydraulics, an avulsion could
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question arose by accretion will seek to prove that: (1) the land
is of comparatively low elevation, (2) vegetation or tree growth is
not have formed Luna Bar. They also noted a total absence of any
known historical reference to an avulsion in the area. In addition,
Mississippi presented expert testimony and physical evidence of: (1)
the tree growth on Luna Bar, consisting predominantly of pioneer trees
such as willows, (2) soil compositions including deep borings, (3) ele-
vation records showing Luna Bar to be 12 feet below the Arkansas
River banks, (4) the absence of levees on Luna Bar, and (5) charts
of 1882 and 1894 showing "Luna Bar as a dry sandbar with no vegeta-
tion." Id. at 293-94. According to the Supreme Court, this evidence
provided Mississippi with a prima facie case that Luna Bar had
emerged by way of accretion. Id. at 294. The court gave particular
weight to the expert testimony presented by Mississippi, and to his-
torical charts and documents. It regarded physical evidence as corrob-
oration for Mississippi's experts and as an indicator of which experts
presented the best theories: "[There was] pertinent and persuasive
testimony . . . from expert witnesses for Mississippi. The latter are
the witnesses that the Special Master credited, as do we, in the
evaluation of the conflicting testimony." Id. at 292.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, found the Arkansas evidence of avul-
sion more persuasive. Douglas gave particular weight to lay witnesses
used by Arkansas, and to the theory that the Mississippi had returned
to its old, dry channel, cutting off Luna Bar. Id. at 298. He was im-
pressed by soil borings and by three ancient cypress stumps found on
Luna Bar:
No one has a historical recorded account of what happened.
Mississippi made its case by use of experts who testified as
to how the Mississippi River usually performs.... Never
did the experts know of an instance where avulsion had
worked the way Arkansas claims.
T he experts of Mississippi state a plausible explana-
tion that bolsters the theory of accretion. But the countrymen
with their physical evidence convince me that the Mississippi
River acted in an unprecedented way ....
Id. at 295, 298 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The majority had discredited
the "stump" evidence, concluding that the stumps had been washed
onto the bar by floods, as indicated by moss on the roots. Id. at 293.
In the Nebraska case of Wemmer v. Young, 167 Neb. 495, 93 N.W.2d
837 (1958), the plaintiff sought to quiet title to land by the Platte
River. The defendants asserted that the land in question had eroded
away, making their land riparian, and then had re-emerged by way
of accretion. Because Nebraska does not recognize a doctrine of re-
emergence, the defendants claimed ownership to the accretion and
maintained possession of the land for 40 years. Id. at 499, 93 N.W.2d
at 839. Plaintiff denied that the land to which he claimed title had
ever eroded away to the defendants' boundary. In determining the
extent of the erosion and accretion, the Nebraska Supreme Court ex-
amined maps and aerial photographs, but gave particular attention to
lay and expert testimony. Lay witnesses were several elderly resi-
dents of the vicinity who told personal recollections of the movement
of the high bank of the Platte. The chief expert witness was an edu-
cated and experienced forester who calculated the age of the property
ACCRETION AND AVULSION
comparatively recent or "pioneer" in nature, as are small willows,
(3) soil borings indicate the presence of alluvium soil to a greater
depth than in surrounding land, and (4) the land in question lies
downstream from older property-upstream from the main flow
of water-because river flow is likely to be slower near the down-
stream side of land, including islands, and will, therefore, deposit
more alluvium on the downstream side. In contrast, a party seek-
ing to prove that land was displaced by avulsion will attempt to
demonstrate that: (1) the land is higher in elevation than other
land which is known to have arisen by accretion, (2) tree growth,
stumps, and man-made structures or markers are older than those
on nearby land which arose by accretion, (3) soil borings indicate
a bedrock base or other soil base inconsistent with accretion, (4)
maps and other historical records indicate that a chute existed be-
hind the land, or that islands with tree growth were periodically
charted in the channel. Both parties would probably have expert
witnesses interpret physical evidence, and might have lay witnesses
present personal recollections. The presumption usually would
favor the party seeking to prove accretion, because avulsion is rarer
and a party whose land is severed from the shore by avulsion is
expected to maintain possession of the land, or at least keep a record
of its change in form.
C. Artificial Influence
Much modern accretion and avulsion is caused by artificial
means.2 8  A landowner whose property is affected by artificially
in question by counting the rings on cottonwood trees. Id. at 505-07,
93 N.W.2d at 844-45. It was this lay and expert testimony which
helped the court determine what land had grown by accretion, when
the accretion had occurred, and therefore, how the property should be
apportioned between the parties.
In Mather v. State, 200 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa 1972), an action was
brought to settle ownership of accretion land caused by pile dikes
driven by the Army Corps of Engineers between a state-owned island
and the privately owned shoreline. The Iowa Supreme Court found
aerial and ground photographs most persuasive in reaching its conclu-
sion in favor of the state. The court also relied on expert and lay
witnesses and on willow cross-sections which indicated the age and
permanence of the government-owned island. Id. at 501-02.
28. For general discussions of changes in river movement caused by arti-
ficial means, see Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 249 (1975); Annot., 134 A.L.R.
467 (1941); Lundquist, Artificial Additions to Riparian Land: Extend-
ing the Doctrine of Accretion, 14 Amz. L. REv. 315 (1972); Note, Prop-
erty-Rights of Riparian Owners to Alluvion Formed as a Result of
the Works of Man, 18 LA. L. REv. 739 (1958); Note, Waters and Water-
courses-Riparian Rights-Accessions, 29 TurANE L. Rav. 362 (1955);
25 Miss. LJ. 174 (1954).
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induced river movement is subject to the same legal consequences
as he would be if nature had caused the change. 29  On the
Nebraska-Iowa border, revetments, 0 dikes,31 and abatis32 were
built by the Army Corps of Engineers in the early 1940's to harness,
narrow, and deepen the Missouri. In 1943, Nebraska and Iowa as-
sumed that the Corps had the river permanently harnessed, and
agreed that their border would no longer change with the flow of
the Missouri, but would remain constant at the 1943 channel.3 3 Un-
fortunately, both states neglected to inform the Army Corps of En-
gineers of their need for a 1943 map of the river channel, so no
official survey or map was made. In addition, with the progress
of World War II, the Corps had more pressing tasks to perform
than the stabilization of the Missouri. Because of the lack of stabil-
ization, the river broke loose from the 1943 channel. Today, how-
ever, the river is stable and not likely to change its course further.
Those whose lands which were disturbed by the rechanneling
of the Missouri, gained or lost property according to common law
principles of accretion and avulsion, just as if the changes had been
caused by nature. This principle was reaffirmed by the United
States Supreme Court as recently as 1973 in Bonelli Cattle Co. v.
29. For cases relating to accretion, see Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414
U.S. 313 (1973); Sieck v. Godsey, 254 Iowa 624, 118 N.W.2d 555 (1962);
Solomon v. City of Sioux City, 243 Iowa 634, 51 N.W.2d 472 (1952);
Krumweide v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491 (1964); Krimlofski
v. Matters, 174 Neb. 774, 119 N.W.2d 501 (1963); Durfee v. Keiffer, 168
Neb. 272, 95 N.W.2d 618 (1959); Burket v. Krimlofski, 167 Neb. 45, 91
N.W.2d 57 (1958); Ziema v. Zeller, 165 Neb. 419, 86 N.W.2d 190 (1957);
Frank v. Smith, 138 Neb. 382, 293 N.W. 329 (1940); Gill v. Lydick, 40
Neb. 508, 59 N.W. 104 (1894).
For cases relating to avulsion, see Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605 (1912); Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359 (1891); Anderson-
Tully Co. v. Walls, 266 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Miss. 1967).
30. Revetments are often confused with dikes. A revetment is a retaining
wall built parallel to the river to keep it from overflowing its banks
onto neighboring land. In Nebraska or Iowa, a Dutch boy would put
his finger in a revetment, not a dike.
31. A dike is built at an angle to the river, extending into the water. Dikes
cause a river to deposit silt when the water contacts the dike, and can
thereby direct the river meander. Such a dike may also be referred
to as a jetty.
32. An abatis is similar to a dike, but is built on land, not in the river
itself.
33. Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact, Act of July 12, 1943, Pub. L. No.
134, ch. 220 (57 Stat. 494). The two states agreed to exchange lands
belonging to each state which lay on the opposite side of the river
from that state. The sole exception was Carter Lake, Iowa, which was
not forfeited. Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compromise, ch. 306, 1943
Iowa Acts 401 (1943); Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact, ch. 130, 1943
Neb. Laws 434 (1943).
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Arizona.3 4 In Bonelli, the cattle company lost property when the
Colorado River slowly moved to the east. Under Arizona law, the
state claimed the river bed. Later, by artificial rechanneling, the
river was pushed back to the west, and the cattle company re-
claimed the land abandoned by the river. Although the Arizona
Supreme Court held that the dry bed still belonged to the state,
the United States Supreme Court held that it was the Cattle Com-
pany's property as a riparian owner. Among the Supreme Court's
reasons was the principle that artificially induced river movement
gives rise to the same legal results as movement caused by nature.3"
III. BLACKBIRD BEND
A. What Law Applies?
The rules pertaining to accretion and avulsion have evolved
through common law. But the common law of each state, and of
the federal government as well, may differ on the question of what
results apply to given situations.36 In the Blackbird Bend case, the
Omaha Indian Tribe, the federal government acting as trustee for
the tribe, and certain possessors of land in a state adjacent to the
tribal reservation were major parties to the land dispute.37 What
common law should have applied?
Before Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,8 it generally was believed
that no federal common law existed.3 9 However, since 1938, federal
common law has been recognized and expanded.40 It is to be ap-
plied in any case where there is an overriding interest in the need
for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches
the basic interests of federalism.41 One year after Erie, the state
common law v. federal common law question was applied by the
United States Supreme Court to a case involving Indian land. In
34. 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
35. Id. at 327. See also Lundquist, supra note 28.
36. In the Blackbird Bend case, the district court determined that the com-
mon law of Nebraska applied. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp.
57, 62 (N.D. Iowa 1977). If the court had applied the common law
of Iowa or the United States instead, it would have followed the
reasoning of a different line of cases, but the result would probably
have been the same, because the common law of Nebraska, Iowa, and
the United States are similar on issues relating to river movement.
37. The Omaha Indian Tribe viewed the federal government as an adver-
sary. Therefore, the tribe employed its own attorneys and reserved
the right to cross-examine government witnesses.
38. 304U.S. 64 (1938).
39. See Gatton v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 95 Iowa 112, 63 N.W. 589 (1895).
40. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
41. Id. at 103.
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Board of County Commissioners v. United States,42 the United
States brought suit as an Indian's guardian against a Kansas county
to recover property taxes illegally collected on the Indian's tax-
exempt land. The Court held that federal law, rather than Kansas
law applied. This was true even though no federal statute con-
trolled the question, because the origin of the right to be enforced
was an Indian treaty.43 The Court noted: "[W]hatever rule we
fashion is ultimately attributable to the Constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States, and does not owe its authority to
the law-making agencies of Kansas. '44
In the 1930's, the philosophy of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit was in accord with the County Commis-
sioners case. In United States v. First National Bank of Decatur,45
the United States brought suit for the Omaha Indian Tribe against
the bank which had purchased lands formerly belonging to the
tribe. The Missouri had moved west, making the bank's lands ri-
parian and washing away the Indian lands. Then, the river moved
east and the bank claimed the accreted lands. The court noted that
Nebraska law did not recognize the doctrine of re-emergence, but
held that federal law applied.4 6 The court examined the federal
government's intent in making the original conveyance to the tribe,
and held that the accreted lands should belong to the tribe. It
stressed federal policy rather than federal statutes, treaties, or any
doctrine of re-emergence recognized in federal common law.
The United States Supreme Court appeared to waiver from its
stance in 1943, when it applied state law to an issue of Indian land
rights. In United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co.,4 7 the
United States brought suit to enjoin an Oklahoma utility from
maintaining its pole line along a highway crossing allotted Indian
land. The utility based its right on a license from the state highway
commission, which was granted pursuant to authority from the Sec-
retary of Interior.4 8 A federal statute had granted the secretary
the right to permit local authorities to build highways through In-
dian lands "in accordance with the laws of the State or Territory
in which the lands are situated."49 The secretary contended that
permission to build a highway did not constitute permission to build
42. 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
43. Id. at 349-50.
44. Id.
45. 56 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1931).
46. Id. at 635.
47. 318 U.S. 206 (1943).
48. Id. at 208.
49. Id.
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a utility pole, but the Court ruled that the statutory language indi-
cated that the question was to be answered by reference to state
law, absent any governing administrative ruling, statute or dom-
inating congressional policy to the contrary. The court also stated:
It is well settled that a conveyance by the United States of land
which it owns beneficially or, as in this case, for the purpose of
exercising its guardianship over Indians, is to be construed, in the
absence of any contrary indication of intention, according to the
law of the State where the land lies.5 0
However, in 1967, the United States Supreme Court seemed to
return to its original 1939 philosophy in Hughes v. Washington.51
In Hughes the Court determined that federal law, rather than state
law, governed questions of ownership of accretions to oceanfront
property conveyed by the United States prior to statehood. The
Court held that the owner of upland littoral property was entitled
to accretion notwithstanding the Washington State Constitution to
the contrary. The Court's rationale was based on the fact that title
to the littoral property could be traced back to a federal grant;
therefore, federal statutes should apply.52 Hughes struck fear in
the hearts of commentators who believed that accretion is a matter
which affects states in various ways and which may be regulated
better on a state-by-state basis.53 The commentators particularly
feared the effects the case could have on property west of the Mis-
sissippi, because original title to virtually all such property could
be traced to federal land grants.5 4 However, since 1967, the Hughes
doctrine has not been expanded to govern riparian accretion.
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit was again faced with a dispute over riparian land claimed by
Indians. The court skirted the conflicting Supreme Court case law
by holding that "general rules of law" and not federal Indian land
policy were to be applied. In Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe,5 5 riparian
landowners in Iowa brought action to quiet title to land formed
after 1867 by the receding of the Missouri from its east meander
50. Id. at 209-10 (footnote omitted).
51. 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
52. Id. at 292.
53. Beck, Hughes v. Washington: Some Federal Common Law in the
Real Property Area, 47 N.D.L. REv. 77 (1970); Comment, The Fed-
eral Common Law of Accretion: A New Element in Property Law,
35 LA. L. Rv. 178 (1974); Note, Federal Law and Seashore Accretion,
28 LA. L. REV. 655 (1968); Note, The Federal Rule of Accretion and
California Coastal Protection, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 1457 (1975).54. Beck, supra note 53. See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290,
295 (Stewart, J., concurring).
55. 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1970).
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line. The defendant was the Omaha Indian Tribe whose land had
washed away. Common law rules of accretion were applied and
the title was quieted in the Iowa riparian owners. The court did
not distinguish between federal and state common law relating to
river movement, nor did it say which law it had applied. However,
by stating that "general rules of law" and not federal Indian land
policies were controlling,5 6 the court avoided relying on either Okla-
homa Gas or Hughes, and indicated that the common law rules of
accretion and avulsion were the same in federal and state cases re-
lating to riparian land.
Therefore, in the Blackbird Bend case, arguments were possible
both for the application of federal common law and for the applica-
tion of Iowa common law. If one were to assert that federal com-
mon law should be used, one would argue that: (1) Board of County
Commissioners, First National Bank of Decatur, and Hughes were
controlling, (2) the origin of the Omaha Indians' claim lay in the
federal treaty and statute which gave grounds for the suit, (3) the
United States government itself had asserted an interest in the land,
and (4) there was an overriding federal interest in a uniform rule
because the controversy touched the basic interests of federalism.
If one were to argue that Iowa common law should apply, one
would claim that: (1) Oklahoma Gas and Fontenelle were control-
ling, (2) there was no overriding federal interest in a uniform rule,
nor did the controversy touch the basic interests of federalism, and
(3) the question of accretion or avulsion did not involve a question
of interpretation of federal law.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa determined that the law of Nebraska applied to the Blackbird
Bend case.57 Judge Bogue relied most heavily on the 1972 Supreme
56. Id. at 146.
57. See note 36 supra. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that
state law generally governs title disputes to land within the state.
United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57, 59 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Mason
v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923); Joy v. City of St. Louis, 201
U.S. 332 (1906). It also noted that the fact that the United States
is trustee for a tribe does not make federal law controlling in a dispute
regarding the tribe. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. at 61.
See generally United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580 (1973); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923). The
court dismissed the holding of Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290
(1967), as confined to its facts and not applicable to riparian cases.
United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. at 61. The court indicated
that most cases dealing with land disputes in which Indian tribes
have been parties have been decided on the basis of state law. Id.
See Francis v. Francis, 203 U.S. 233 (1906); Herron v. Choctaw
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Court case of Nebraska v. Iowa, in which the Court determined that
on the Nebraska-Iowa border, disputes regarding the title to land
formed after 1943 would be governed by Iowa law unless the claim-
ants could show good title under Nebraska law as of the 1943 Com-
pact date.58 By adopting this unique rule of Nebraska v. Iowa,
Bogue accepted the dictum in that case to the effect that the present
Blackbird Bend area had been formed after 1943,59 and he implied
that the title the Indians had to prove must relate back to the 1854
treaty and must be valid under Nebraska law.60 In his findings
of fact, however, Bogue recognized that the Blackbird Bend area
had been formed in the late 1800's and early 1900's. 61
The decision by the federal district court surprised all parties
to the Blackbird Bend suit, as the government and Indians were
arguing for the application of federal common law, and the record
title holders were urging the application of Iowa common law.
The choice of law was significant in one respect-its allocation
of the burden of persuasion. Iowa cases expressly state that accre-
tion will be presumed over avulsion.6 2 Nebraska cases do not stress
this presumption, but place the burden of persuasion on one who
seeks to quiet title.63 Under Nebraska law, both the Indians and
the record title holders had the burden of persuasion in their re-
spective claims to quiet title. As the court noted, federal law, Iowa
law, and Nebraska law are so similar regarding accretion and avul-
sion that the application of any of the three would have led to the
same substantive result.64
B. The Facts
All sides to the Blackbird Bend litigation presented maps, aerial
photographs, and expert witnesses who interpreted the maps,
photos and other physical evidence.
The evidence presented showed the following sequence of events.
In 1867, the time of the first official survey after the 1854 grant,
the Blackbird Bend peninsula stretched east about three miles, pok-
& Chickasaw Nations, 228 F.2d 830 (1Oth Cir. 1956); Fontenelle v.
Omaha Tribe, 298 F. Supp. 855 (D. Neb. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d 143 (8th
Cir. 1970). But see Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226 (1924).
58. 406 U.S. 117, 124 (1972).
59. Id. at 120 n.4.
60. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67, 71 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
61. Id. at 79, 85.
62. See note 20 supra.
63. Mitchell v. Beermann, 175 Neb. 616, 122 N.W.2d 525 (1963); Jones v.
Schmidt, 170 Neb. 351, 102 N.W.2d 640 (1960); Bissel v. Fletcher, 27
Neb. 582, 43 N.W. 350 (1889).
64. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 57, 65 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
828 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 56, NO. 4 (1977)
ing a long finger of land into Iowa's western border." By 1879,
however, only a stub was left of the long finger of land. The Mis-
souri in the Blackbird Bend area was a braided channel with sand-
bars, and apparently one small island where the finger tip had
been.6 In 1890, the Missouri at Blackbird Bend was still a braided
channel, with large sandbars, but the river had pushed farther west.
Under the "piece of sky" where the fingertip had been now lay
soil almost one mile across, attached to the Iowa bank.67 In 1923,
the area where the 1867 finger lay was almost entirely in Iowa.68
By 1937, the finger which once was west of the Missouri lay entirely
in Iowa, under willows and scattered timber.69
The secret of how the land of Blackbird Bend disappeared, or
was transported, lay in the braided channel of the late 1800's and
early 1900's. Were islands, cut off from the western bank, accepting
accretion as the river moved to the west? Or was the Blackbird
Bend land eroded completely, with mere sandbars, not subject to
ownership, appearing in the river, and soil accreting to the eastern
banks?
The court determined that the most persuasive evidence showed
that the land allocated to the Indians had been eroded and washed
away, while the land subject to litigation had been formed by ac-
cretion to riparian land on the Iowa side of the river.70 The series
of maps drawn in the late 1800's and early 1900's, as interpreted
by expert witnesses, were given particular weight. In addition, the
court considered lay testimony, supporting documents such as let-
ters of the period describing the erosion of the Nebraska banks,
and physical evidence such as soil borings and tree cuttings.
C. The Effect of the Court's Decision
The Blackbird Bend case received wide publicity in the regional
media. 71 The media's account of the case, however, did not stress
the court's opinion as much as a brief prefatory letter written by
Bogue to the parties. In this letter, Bogue stated:
A pathetic aspect of this case is that the Omaha Indian Tribe
65. Barrett Survey, supra note 3.
66. Missouri River Commission Map (June 16-26 1879).
67. Missouri River Commission Map of 1890 (published 1893).
68. Army Corps of Engineers, United States Map (Sept. 1923).
69. Army Corps of Engineers, United States Reconnaissance Map (Nov.
2,1937).
70. United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67, 88 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
71. The Des Moines Register, May 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Lincoln Journal,
May 5, 1977, at 36, col. 3, and May 13, 1977, at 15, col. 1; Omaha World
Herald, May 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1, and May 14, 1977, at 15, col. 1; The
Sioux City Journal, May 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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has been deprived of land it once owned by the actions of the Mis-
souri River and the laws of accretion. This Court feels constrained
to state at this time its distaste for such laws of avulsion and ac-
cretion which have brought about this seemingly unfair situation.
The Barrett Survey area was reserved for the Tribe and was de-
scribed as being bounded on three sides by the Missour [sic] River.
The description should have been established by degrees of longi-
tude and latitude or some other permanent type of description and
should have remained the property of the Tribe for evermore no
matter whether it was under water or divided in whole or in part
by water, and no matter how it got that way. The law as it now
exists should be changed. The wild unpredictable movements of
this river have caused great loss and hardship and attendant litiga-
tion for years to countless people, both Indian and non-Indian.
The least that should be done at this point is for the Congress
to reimburse the Tribe for its loss. If this Court had the power
to order such payment, you can rest assured it would be done.72
Judge Bogue's letter evokes several questions of policy regarding
river movement and Indian lands: (1) Are the historical rules of
accretion and avulsion justified; (2) Should transfers of riparian
land-especially when the government acts as transferor-be made
with reference to metes and bounds or latitudinal- and longitudinal
degrees instead of by reference to river boundaries; (3) Should a
statute of limitations or estoppel apply to claims made by govern-
ments or Indian tribes to lands held by good faith purchasers; (4)
Should the federal government reimburse an Indian tribe when its
land is diminished by erosion?
1. The Policy of Accretion Law
As noted, the rules of accretion and avulsion have remained gen-
erally consistent since Roman days.73 What policies have led courts
to favor rules of accretion and avulsion over a standard of re-
emergence for 2,000 years?
The major policy reason appears to be economic. Rules of accre-
tion and avulsion help to insure that land will be put to its highest
and best use. Because land accretes slowly to a river bank, the
farmer to whose land it accretes will have easiest access to the
newly formed land. He can use, care for, and farm new soil more
conveniently along with his other property than can a farmer across
the river whose land has begun to erode. This economic rationale
is especially valid when applied to land bordering a river the size
72. Letter from Judge Andrew W. Bogue to the parties in the Blackbird
Bend dispute (May 2, 1977) (incorporated as part of the record in
United States v. Wilson, No. C 75-4024, slip op. (N.D. Iowa, May 2,
1977).
73. See note 6 supra.
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of the Missouri. In addition, by the time a large amount of land
has accreted to one bank or another, a new generation of farmers
would be tilling the soil-possibly new purchasers of the property
who had not relied on possessing the land that had been eroded.
A second policy supporting rules of accretion and avulsion re-
lates to the land's riparian status. Land bordering on a body of
water may be more valuable than other property because of its irri-
gation, transportation, or recreational potential. If a purchaser of
riparian land is deprived of access to the water when a strip of
land accretes to his shore, his use of his land may be altered and
the value of his property substantially reduced.
A third reason supporting existing rules of accretion and avul-
sion is the difference in state law regarding ownership of river beds.
A change to a standard of re-emergence would necessitate a change
in state laws, such as Iowa's, which give title to the bed of the
river, and any islands arising from the bed, to the state.
2. Uses of Metes and Bounds
What if the land reserved for the Omaha Indian Tribe in 1854
had been described by latitudinal and longitudinal marks or by
metes and bounds? Cases dealing with riparian land described by
metes and bounds hold that the policies behind rules of accretion
outweigh any advantages of allowing the riparian land to be trans-
ferred by metes and bounds.
In Choctaw & Chicasaw Nations v. Cox,7 4 the Indian tribes sold
land to the defendants. The land, although bordering on a river,
was described by metes and bounds. The Indian tribes claimed
rights to the land accreted, claiming that the boundary was the
legal description and not the river. The court rejected the Indians'
claims, holding that even though the land was described by metes
and bounds, the actual boundary was the river: "It is well settled
law that a conveyance of lands bordered by a river and intended
to be riparian, though the river boundary is described by metes
and bounds, as here, carries with it all accreted lands."7 5
Although the Choctaw case is the most similar to the Blackbird
Bend situation, it does rely on considerable support from earlier
decisions, 76 which hold that lands conveyed by metes and bounds
74. 251 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1958).
75. Id. at 735.
76. Stone v. McFarlin, 249 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1957); Littlefield v. Nelson,
246 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1957); Braddock v. Wilkins, 182 Okla. 5, 75
P.2d 1139 (1938). See also De Long v. Olsen, 63 Neb. 327, 88 N.W.
512 (1901).
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or lot numbers, yet bordering on rivers, have the rivers as their
true boundaries.
These cases indicate that even if the land reserved by the
government for the Omaha Indian Tribe had been described
by metes and bounds or latitudinal and longitudinal degrees, the
land should still be considered riparian because it bordered on the
river at the time the grant was made.
In addition, even if the doctrine of re-emergence had been ac-
cepted by the court, it would have been of little help to the Indians,
because the doctrine of re-emergence is not applied across a body
of water. "Where a river is a boundary, and there is no avulsion,
a landowner can never cross the river to claim an accretion on the
other side."77
3. Statutes of Limitations and Estoppe:
An individual cannot gain property through adverse possession
against the government.78 In many cases, such as in the Blackbird
Bend dispute, where the government is acting as trustee under
treaty or is acting to preserve national and state parks or resources,
such a rule may be justified.79 However, in many other in-
stances where a government holds title in its proprietary rather
than governmental capacity, the rule is not justified.80 In still
other cases, the government may have delayed action for so long
after receiving notice of the private possession of government prop-
77. Anderson-Tully Co. v. Tingle, 166 F.2d 224, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1948).
78. See State v. Cheyenne County, 123 Neb. 1, 241 N.W. 747 (1932);
Topping v. Cohn, 71 Neb. 559, 99 N.W. 372 (1904).
79. Where the federal, or a state government or a municipality, acts under
a treaty or acts to preserve parks, forests, or natural resources, the
public interest demands that such properties be protected from ad-
verse possession. In addition, such lands may be so extensive that
the government may not receive adequate notice that an adverse pos-
sessor is laying claim to a part of the property.
80. One example of land held in a proprietary capacity by the state gov-
ernment is section 16 of every township in Nebraska, held by the state
for the benefit of public schools. Such land is to be used for public
school grounds, or invested with proceeds used for the benefit of pub-
lic schools. See State v. Matzen, 197 Neb. 592, 250 N.W.2d 232 (1977).
In Matzen, the state claimed title to a "kidney-shaped" island sepa-
rated by a chute from section 16 of a township near the Missouri. The
defendant contended, among other things, that the state owned section
16 in its proprietary capacity and should be subjected to claims of ad-
verse possession. The Nebraska Supreme Court found for the defend-
ants, but on the grounds that the land had arisen as an island and
as accretion to the island, rather than having been formed by accretion
to section 16. The court did not consider the issue of adverse posses-
sion.
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erty that it would be unjust for the government to claim title to
the land.
In tort cases, a government is often held to the same standards
applied to individuals and corporations if it is acting in its propri-
etary rather than governmental capacity. Although sovereign im-
munity from the statute of limitations has not disappeared in cases
of adverse possession, the statute should run against the govern-
ment where it holds title in its proprietary capacity for investment
purposes.
For example, in the tort case of Stadler v. Curtis Gas, Inc.,,"
the decedent was injured in a gas explosion caused by a defective
valve on a water heater. The heater was in the decedent's resi-
dence, leased from a defendant, the University of Nebraska Board
of Regents. Because the Board of Regents was acting in a nongov-
ernmental proprietary capacity, the Nebraska Supreme Court held
that the Board was not entitled to immunity.
Similarly, in Sorensen v. Chimney Rock Public Power Dis-
trict,82 the Nebraska Supreme Court held the Power District liable
for retaining electrical equipment without rendering full compensa-
tion to the seller:
[W] hen a state, by itself or through its corporate creations embarks
in an enterprise, especially when commercial in character or which
is usually carried on by individuals or private companies, its sov-
ereign character is ordinarily waived, and it is subject to like regu-
lations with persons engaged in the same calling. 8
Iowa has also recognized the dual role played by governments,
and may hold them to different standards depending upon which
role they are performing.8 4
In cases of estoppel, most courts hold that government property
cannot be lost by acquiescence of employees of the government,8 5
and that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by the
81. 182 Neb. 6,151 N.W.2d 915 (1967).
82. 138 Neb. 350, 293 N.W. 121 (1940).
83. Id. at 354, 293 N.W. at 123.
84. State v. F.W. Fitch Co., 236 Iowa 208, 17 N.W.2d 380 (1945). "There
is a distinction between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign
immunity from liability. The latter exists when the sovereign is en-
gaged in a governmental function." Id. at 215, 17 N.W.2d at 384 (quot-
ing from Manion v. State Highway Comm'r, 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d
527, 528, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 677 (1942)).
85. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1947); Utah v.
United States, 384 U.S. 534, 545-46 (1932); Lee Wilson & Co. v. United
States, 245 U.S. 24, 32 (1917).
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acts of its officers.8 6 However, estoppel has been applied against
governments in limited circumstances.87
For example, the government may be estopped from claiming
land or water rights where facts cannot be ascertained with cer-
tainty, many years have elapsed, and it has failed to take action
to enforce its claim.88 In United States v. Big Bend Transit Co.,8s
a corporation spent more than $250,000 in reliance on grants of
water rights, and the United States was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the validity of the rights of the corporation to the water
and land involved. In Indiana v. Milk,90 the state sued to recover
possession of approximately 3,000 acres of land. The court held that
"[h] aving induced the defendants by repeatedly recognizing the
validity of [their title] ... to alter their position by investing their
money in that title, the state cannot now, in fairness, allow or assert
its invalidity." 91 In United States v. Property on Pinto Island,92
the federal government commenced condemnation proceedings
against defendant owners of land on the island. Facts regarding
the land's historical boundaries were difficult to discern. The court
held that because the government asserted no claim to any part
of the land from 1859 to 1933, and that because the defendant's pred-
ecessors in title began reclaiming and improving the property in
1906, the government was estopped from asserting a claim of title
or ownership to the reclaimed land.93
86. This has also been held to include implied acquiescence to improve-
ments made on land. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917).
87. See Jarvis v. United States, 342 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam);
Walsonavich v. United States, 335 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Certain Lands in County of San Diego, 214 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Cal.
1963); In re United States by Inland Waterways Corp., 212 F. Supp.
214 (E.D. La. 1962) (dictum); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equal., 47 Cal. 2d 384, 303 P.2d 1034 (1956).
88. For example, in a government suit to set aside patents to land, 40 years
had elapsed and the defendant had substantially improved the land.
The court applied estoppel against the government and held: "[W]hen
the government seeks its rights at the hands of a court, equity requires
that the rights of others, as well, should be protected." United States
v. Stinson, 125 F. 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1903). See also Massaglia v. Com-
missioner, 286 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1961); California State Bd. of Equal.
v. Coast Radio Prods., 228 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1955); Knetsch v. United
States, 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965); United States v. Fox Lake State
Bank, 225 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
89. 42 F. Supp. 459, 474-75 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
90. 11 F. 389 (C.C.D. Ind. 1882).
91. Id. at 397.
92. 74 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Ala. 1947).
93. Id. at 102.
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Probably most similar to the Blackbird Bend situation is Iowa
v. Carr,94 in which an avulsion occurred on government land adja-
cent to the Missouri River. The government made no claim to the
land for more than twenty-six years. During that time, the private
landowners and their predecessors in title had been in possession of
the land, paid taxes on it, and made valuable improvements. The
court held that the state was estopped from asserting a claim to the
land.9 5 Although the Blackbird Bend case involved a claim by the
federal government instead of a state, it should be noted that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has indicated
that the United States government may be subject to the same
standards of estoppel that can be used against state governments.96
These tort and estoppel cases demonstrate that adverse posses-
sion against the government may not be totally invalid. Exceptions
should be made when the government acts in its proprietary capac-
ity or when many years have elapsed and the government has failed
to assert its claim to the property after receiving notice of the claim
of a private party.
In addition to theories of tort and estoppel, an economic analy-
sis may come into play when a government claims land which a
private party has possessed and improved for the statutory term
of adverse possession. The public's interest in preserving govern-
ment property may be outweighed by the public's interest in seeing
that land is put to its most productive or long-term beneficial use.
4. Reimbursing the Loser
An owner of property along an unharnessed river is a gambler.
His land may increase or diminish without reference to his efforts.
When the Omaha Indians signed the treaty of 1854,9 7 it is un-
likely that they were familiar with the white man's law of river
movement. Because the federal government had an interest in see-
ing that the Indians had enough property to farm,98 new grants
were allotted to individual Indians whose property had washed
away.9
9
94. 191 F. 257 (8th Cir. 1911).
95. Id. at 270.
96. Goldstein v. United States, 227 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
97. See note 2 supra.
98. One of the federal government's major purposes in establishing the
reservation was to change the Indians from hunters into farmers.
Treaty with the Omahas, March 16, 1854, supra note 2.
99. Letters from the Superintendent of the Omaha Agency of the Omaha
Indian Reservation to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs and to the Secretary of the Interior, 1907-1922, entered as Plain-
tiff's exhibits A through P, United States v. Wilson, 433 F. Supp. 67,
81 (N.D. Iowa 1977).
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The same philosophy that led the federal government to reim-
burse individual Indians with new land could be used to reimburse
the tribe for its losses-probably in money rather than land. How-
ever, the Omaha Indian Tribe was not really a "loser" to the river's
force of erosion. In fact, the Omaha Indian Tribe's reservation is
larger than it was in 1854, due to natural and artificial accretion
along the Missouri banks. 100
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the rechanneling of the Missouri and Mississippi indi-
cates that disputes over riparian property beside those two rivers
will decline, there are twenty-six other rivers in Nebraska' 0' and
Iowa,102 along with numerous streams and creeks, which wind un-
harnessed across fertile and valuable land. As farmland prices soar,
litigation over riparian property may include disputes over smaller
portions of land.10 3 More than ever, therefore, it is important that
the rights of landowners, against their neighbors and against the
government, be made clear.
The Battle of Blackbird Bend was fought by farmers and Indians
with the modern weapons of attorneys and evidence. The opinion
that emerged at the end of the battle was basically a determination
of facts-a ruling that the Missouri had changed course by accretion
and not avulsion in this instance. The issues that the court did
not need to resolve to reach its decision-particularly a limitation
on the number of years a government can wait before asserting
a claim to land-are not likely to lie dormant for long.104
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100. See surveys cited in notes 3, 66-69 supra.
101. Rivers within the Nebraska boundaries include the Big Blue, Elkhorn,
Loup, Middle Loup, Niobrara, North Loup, North Platte, Platte, Re-
publican, South Loup, South Platte, and White.
102. Rivers within the Iowa boundaries include the Big Sioux, Chariton,
Des Moines (south), Des Moines (west), Floyd, Grand, Iowa, Nishna-
botna, Nodaway, Raccoon, Shellrock, Skunk, Turkey, and Wapsipin-
icon.
103. Most suits involving accretion and avulsion are settled by adverse pos-
session if between private parties. However, when the state or federal
government is a party, issues of accretion and avulsion become crucial.
104. In Maine, 10,000,000 acres have been claimed by the Passamaquoddy
Tribe and the Penobscot Nation. In New York, 300,000 acres in the
center of the state have been claimed by the Oneida Tribe. In Massa-
chusetts, 22,000 acres have been claimed by the Wampanoag Tribe. In
Rhode Island, 3,200 acres have been claimed by the Narraganset Tribe.
In Connecticut, 1,300 acres have been claimed by the Schaghticoke
Tribe and 1,000 acres by the Western Pequot Tribe. In South Carolina,
144,000 acres have been claimed by the Catawba Tribe. For discussion
of these pending suits, see US. NEws & WoanD REPORT, April 4, 1977,
at 53.
